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A REVIEW OF THE MARYLAND CONSTRUCTION 
TRUST STATUTE DECISIONS IN THE COURT OF 
APPEALS OF MARYLAND AND THE UNITED STATES 
BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF 
MARYLAND 
David F. Albright, Jr. t 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1987 the Maryland General Assembly enacted a statute entitled 
"Trust Relationships in the Construction Industry"· (the "construc-
tion trust statute"). Designed to complement the Maryland Mechan-
ics' Liens Statute,2 the construction trust statute designates that 
money received by a contractor or subcontractor on a construction 
project constitutes a trust fund for the payment of amounts owed 
to lower-tiered subcontractors. 3 Section 9-202 states that "[a]ny of-
ficer, director or employee ... who, with intent to defraud, retains 
or uses" the trust funds "for any purpose other than to pay" lower-
tiered subcontractors is "personally liable to any person dam-
aged . . . ."4 Significantly, the construction trust statute permits the 
t B.A., 1978, Harvard University; J.D., 1981, Georgetown University Law 
Center; Partner, Horn & Bennett, P.A., Baltimore, Maryland .. 
1. MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. §§ 9-201 to -204 (1988 & Supp. 1992). 
2. Id. §§ 9-101 to -114. See generally, David F. Albright, Jr., The Maryland 
Construction Trust Statute: New Personal Liability - Its Scope and Federal 
Bankruptcy Implications, 17 U. BALT. L. REV. 482, 482-83 (1988) (reviewing 
Maryland's Mechanics' Liens Statute). 
3. MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 9-201 (1988 & Supp. 1992). The statute 
provides in pertinent part: 
Id. 
(a) Moneys to be held in trust. - Any moneys paid under a contract 
by an owner to a contractor, or by the owner or contractor to a 
subcontractor for work done or materials furnished, or both, for or 
about a building by any subcontractor, shall be held in trust by the 
contractor or subcontractor, as trustee, for those subcontractors who 
did work or furnished materials, or both, for or about the building, 
for purposes of paying those subcontractors. 
·4. Id. § 9-202. The statute provides the following: 
Id. 
Any officer, director, or employee of any contractor or subcon-
tractor, who, with intent to defraud, retains or uses the moneys held 
in trust under § 9-201 of this subtitle, or any part thereof, for any 
purpose other than to pay those subcontractors for whom the moneys 
are held in trust, shall be personally liable to any person damaged by 
the action. 
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subcontractor to prove a prima facie case of an intent to defraud 
merely by proving that the trust funds have been diverted.s 
In 1988, my first commentary on the construction trust statute6 
addressed the issues regarding the personal liability and the bank-
ruptcy implications of individuals diverting trust funds. 7 At the time 
the commentary was written, no court decisions had been rendered 
regarding the newly enacted construction trust statute. Five years 
later, both the Court of Appeals of Maryland and the United States 
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Maryland provided substantial 
guidance to the practitioner. 
This Article outlines the guidance the courts sitting in Maryland 
have provided. Specifically, this Article analyzes the court of appeals' 
decision in Ferguson Trenching Co. v. Kiehne,s which addressed the 
definition of "intent to defraud" in the context of the construction 
trust statute.9 This Article then discusses several bankruptcy court 
decisions that have interpreted the interplay between the construction 
trust statute and the Bankruptcy Code. These bankruptcy decisions 
address dischargeability, proof of fraud, and the effect of a state 
court judgment in the context of a debtor's discharge. 
II. "INTENT TO DEFRAUD": DEFINITION AND 
PERMISSIBLE EVIDENCE UNDER FERGUSON 
The court of appeals' first construed the construction trust 
statute in Ferguson Trenching Co. v. Kiehne.lO Ferguson defines 
"intent to defraud" under the statute and also provides guidance as 
to the type of evidence that the trier of fact may consider in 
determining whether an "intent to defraud" exists. In addition, the 
court of appeals inconclusively addressed in dicta the burden of proof 
in diversion of trust fund cases, thereby requiring future clarification 
by the court. 
In Ferguson, a subcontractor sought to impose personal liability 
upon the president of a general contractor for the diversion of trust 
5. [d. § 9-203. The statute provides that 
[d. 
[t]he use by any contractor or subcontractor or any officer, director, 
or employee of a contractor or subcontractor of any moneys held in 
trust under § 9-201 of this subtitle, for any other purpose than to 
pay those subcontractors who did work or furnished materials, or 
both, for or about the building, shall be prima facie evidence of intent 
to defraud in a civil action. 
6. Albright, supra note 2. 
7. [d. at 485-503. 
8. 329 Md. 169, 618 A.2d 735 (1993). 
9. [d. at 183-87, 618 A.2d at 741-44. 
10. 329 Md. 169, 618 A.2d 735 (1993). 
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funds. 1I The subcontractor, who performed work at the request of 
the general contractor for a real estate development, claimed that it 
was owed $44,549Y The general contractor admitted that approxi-
mately $45,000 of the funds which it received on the project were 
used for "the payment of debts incurred in connection with other 
construction projects" and "operating expenses. "13 The subcontractor 
obtained a judgment against the general contractor, and thereafter 
filed suit against the general contractor's president, alleging a viola-
tion of the construction trust statute. 14 
The trial court found that the subcontractor did not demonstrate 
that he was intentionally defrauded by the contractor. IS The trial 
judge noted that the general contractor was experiencing financial 
difficulty due to both bad management and the severe decline in the 
industry as a whole, offering a possible alternative explanation for 
his diversion of the funds. 16 The subcontractor appealed, and the 
court of appeals granted certiorari before the court of special appeals 
could consider the case. 11 
The subcontractor raised two primary arguments on appeal. 
First, the subcontractor argued that both the general contractor, as 
a corporate entity, and the president of the general contractor owed 
a fiduciary duty to the subcontractor .18 Second, the subcontractor 
claimed that the trial court failed to apply correctly the presumption 
of prima facie evidence of an intent to defraud set forth in section 
9-203 of the construction trust statute. 19 
In rejecting the subcontractor's first argument, the court of 
appeals focused upon the plain language of the statute. The court 
noted that under the construction trust statute the contracting entity, 
not the individual officers, directors or employees, is the trustee of 
the funds.20 According to the court, nothing in the construction trust 




15. [d. at 174, 618 A.2d at 737. 
16. [d. at 173, 618 A.2d at 737. 
17. [d. at 174, 618 A.2d at 737. 
18. [d. 
19. [d. 
20. [d. at 177,618 A.2d at 739. The statute specifies that the funds "shall be held 
in trust by the contractor." MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 9-201(a) (1988 & 
Supp. 1992). The term "contractor" means the "person who has a contract 
with an owner." [d. § 9-101(d). "Person" includes a "private corporation." 
[d. § I-I01(j). The court contrasted Maryland's statute with those from other 
jurisdictions which specifically impose fiduciary status upon corporate officers. 
Ferguson, 329 Md. at 178-79, 618 A.2d at 739-40 (citing OKLA. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 42, § 153(3) (West 1990) & TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 162.002 (West 1984». 
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statute indicates that individual officers, directors or employees are 
fiduciaries of the lower-tiered subcontractors.21 The court further 
stated that the fiduciary duties established under section 9-201 of the 
construction trust statute "are imposed only on the party to the 
contract. "22 Therefore, fiduciary status is imposed only upon the 
corporate general contractor, not on its officers, directors or em-
ployees. 
Second, the subcontractor contended that under section 9-203 
of the construction trust statute proof of diversion of trust funds 
was not merely evidence of an intent to defraud, but conclusive 
proof of an intent to defraud.23 The court of appeals summarily 
rejected this second argument, stating that no authority supported 
the subcontractor's proposition that prima facie evidence under sec-
tion 9-203 constitutes an irrebuttable or conclusive presumption.24 
The court recognized, however, that there is room for disagreement 
as to the precise meaning of prima facie evidence.2s Citing a well 
regarded Maryland treatise on evidence, the court outlined the fol-
lowing possible interpretations: 
The term "prima facie evidence" is sometimes used to mean 
"compelling evidence," i.e., evidence which shifts the bur-
den of production to the opposing party, and thus to signify 
a true evidentiary rebuttable presumption. It is also used to 
mean "sufficient evidence" to get to the jury, i.e., merely 
that the party with the burden of persuasion has met the 
burden of production and created an issue for the trier of 
fact by giving rise to a permissible inference.26 
While the court stated that it need not choose between these 
approaches in order to reject the subcontractor's interpretation,27 
Judge Chasanow, writing for the court, indicated in dicta that even 
the "sufficient evidence" approach was enough to rebuke the sub-
contractor's contention that anything short of a "conclusive proof" 
interpretation renders the prima facie clause of the statute super flu-
21. Ferguson, 329 Md. at 177, 618 A.2d at 739. While § 9-202 of the construction 
trust statute imposes liability upon officers, directors, or employees of any 
contractor, MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 9-202 (1988 & Supp. 1992), fiduciary 
status is imposed by the preceding section of the statute. See id. § 9-201(a). 
22. Ferguson, 329 Md. at 178, 618 A.2d at 739. 
23. [d. at 179-80, 618 A.2d at 740. 
24. [d. at 183, 618 A.2d at 741. 
25. [d. at 182, 618 A.2d at 741. 
26. [d. (quoting LYNN McLAIN, MARYLAND EVIDENCE: STATE AND FEDERAL, § 301.4, 
at 230-31 (1987) (footnotes omitted». 
27. [d. 
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OUS.28 The court declined the opportunity, however, to decide whether 
prima facie evidence in the context of the construction trust statute 
means "compelling evidence" or merely "sufficient evidence."29 
Thus, the court of appeals left open the question of whether 
proof of diversion of trust funds under section 9-203 of the construc-
tion trust statute merely allows the plaintiff to survive a motion for 
judgment absent other evidence of an intent to defraud, or whether 
such proof actually shifts the burden of production to the defendant. 
This issue of whether the plaintiff or the defendant bears the burden 
of production may be significant in light of the evidence which the 
defendant has in a particular case. If the burden of production of 
evidence is shifted to the defendant, not only would the plaintiff 
survive a motion for judgment, but the defendant would also be 
required to produce"evidence in his defense in order to preclude the 
granting of a motion for judgment in favor of the plaintiff or a" 
preemptory jury instruction in favor of the plaintiff.30 
Regardless of the resolution of this specific burden of production 
issue, the court concluded that proof of a diversion of trust funds 
does not constitute conclusive evidence of an intent to defraud. 31 The 
court stated that a defendant may introduce evidence to convince the 
trier of fact that he or she did not act with the intent to defraud.32 
The court defined "intent to defraud" as "some form of bad faith 
by the defendant ... ," and stated that "the defendant must act 
dishonestly or at least with reckless indifference. "33 The court stated 
that the decision of the trial court was not clearly erroneous because 
it could have found the following facts, anyone of which might 
have negated an intent to defraud: 
(1) all contract funds were devoted to legitimate business 
debts and expenses of [the general contractor]; (2) [the" 
28. [d. at 183, 618 A.2d at 742. The court stated that "[u)nder the statute, proof 
of the diversion of funds allows a plaintiff's case to reach the fact finder 
without the plaintiff otherwise having to prove the defendant's intent to 
defraud." [d. While this preceding statement seems to embrace the concept of 
"sufficient evidence" with regard to the construction trust statute, the court 
made it clear that it was leaving the decision to choose between "sufficient 
evidence" and "compelling evidence" for another day. [d. at 182, 618 A.2d 
at 742. A better interpretation, therefore, is that the court was simply illustrating 
that even the lesser "sufficient evidence" interpretation is enough to counter 
the plaintiff's charge that anything short of a "conclusive proof" interpretation 
renders the language of the statute meaningless. 
29. [d. 
30. LYNN McLAIN, MARYLAND EVIDENCE: STATE AND FEDERAL, § 300.6, at 171 
(1987). 
31. Ferguson, 329 Md. at 182, 618 A.2d at 742. 
32. [d. at 183, 618 A.2d at 742. 
33. [d. at 184, 618 A.2d at 742 (citing Everett v. Baltimore Gas & Elec., 307 Md. 
286, 300, 513 A.2d 882, 889 (1986». 
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general contractor] was undergoing severe financial hardship 
... ; (3) [the general contractor] was from 90 to 120 days 
behind on its payments to creditors; (4) [the general con-
tractor] suffered a net loss of over $200,000 in 1989; (5) 
[the president of the general contractor] consulted with an 
attorney about a possible Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing; (6) 
an amount nearly equal to the amount [the general con-
tractor] owed to [the subcontractor] was still owed [by the 
owner to the general contractor]; (7) [the president of the 
general contractor] invested a large amount of his own 
money ... to keep [the general contractor] in business; and 
(8) [the president of the general contractor] fully intended 
to pay [the subcontractor's] invoice, but [the general con-
tractor's] cash collections fell short of projections.34 
Therefore, the court concluded that enough evidence was presented 
to enable the trial court to find that the president of the general 
contractor "genuinely believed" that the general contractor would 
be able to pay the subcontractor the money it was owed "within a 
reasonable time" out of the general contractor's "anticipated future 
income.' '35 
Consequently, the court of appeals in Ferguson significantly 
clarified definitional and evidentiary issues regarding the construction 
trust statute. The court defined "intent to defraud" as bad faith 
evidenced by dishonesty or reckless indifference; it also indicated 
what type of evidence a defendant may introduce to rebut prima 
facie evidence of an intent to defraud. The court, however, did not 
take the opportunity to construe the scope of the personal liability 
provision, stating instead that the prima facie clause in the statute 
merely gives the plaintiff "an important evidentiary boost. "36 Fur-
thermore, the Ferguson decision did not resolve the question of the 
precise meaning and effect of prima facie evidence of an intent to 
defraud under section 9-203 of Maryland's construction trust statute. 
III. FEDERAL BANKRUPTCY LAW: ATTEMPTED 
NARROWING OF THE EXCEPTION TO DISCHARGE UNDER 
SECTION 523(a)(4). 
A. Dischargeabi/i ty 
As indicated in my first commentary on the construction trust 
statute, an important issue exists as to whether a debt arising under 
34. [d. at 187, 618 A.2d at 743-44. 
35. [d. at 187, 618 A.2d at 744. 
36. [d. at 183, 618 A.2d at 742. In my first commentary, I argued that the court 
would probably construe the scope of the personal liability provision broadly. 
Albright, supra note 2, at 485-93. The focus of that discussion, however, was 
the type of actions which would expose individuals to liability. Therefore, the 
scope of the personal liability provisions remains unresolved. 
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the statute would be nondischargeable in bankruptcy. 37 Section 
523(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code excepts from discharge a debt 
arising from fraud or defalcation of the debtor in the context of a 
fiduciary relationship.38 Although decisions from other jurisdictions 
indicate that a debt arising from construction trust statutes similar 
to Maryland's would be nondischargeable,39 two of the judges on 
the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Maryland in 
two separate opinions have now ruled in favor of the debtor, holding 
that debt arising from the construction trust statute is dischargeable. 
In re MarinlfO addressed the dischargeability of a debt incurred 
as a result of the application of the construction trust statute. In 
Marino, the debtor was an officer, director, employee and sole 
shareholder of a contracting company.41 The debtor's corporation 
acted as the general contractor on two custom homebuilding pro-
jects.42 After failing to pay subcontractors out of the funds received 
from the homeowners, the debtor and his wife filed a voluntary 
petition under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code.43 Both the home-
owners and subcontractors alleged that certain debts were nondis-
chargeable under section 523(a)(4) because of the debtor's breach of 
the construction trust statute. 44 
Section 523(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code provides for the non-
dischargeability of debt when fraud or defalcation occurs while the 
debtor is acting in a fiduciary capacity.4S Judge Derby correctly noted 
that under the Maryland construction trust statute a trust is created 
in favor of the subcontractors, not in favor of the homeowners.46 
The inquiry regarding the subcontractor's challenge to dischargeabil-
ity must then proceed by determining if the Maryland construction 
trust statute creates fiduciary obligations of the type contemplated 
by section 523(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy CodeY 
The fiduciary capacity requirement of section 523(a)(4) is satis-
fied if a technical trust is in existence at the time of the defalcation. 48 
37. [d. at 493-501. 
38. Section 523(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that "[aJ discharge ... 
does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt - ... for fraud or 
defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity .... " 11 V .S.C. § 523(a)(4) 
(1988 & Supp. 1991). 
39. See Albright, supra note 2, at 494-501 (cataloguing the states holding that 
debts arising under construction trust statutes are nondischargeable). 
40. 115 B.R. 863 (Bankr. D. Md. 1990). 
41. [d. at 865. 
42. [d. 
43. [d. 
44. [d. at 866. 
45. 11 V.S.C. § 523(a)(4) (1988 & Supp. 1991). 
46. Marino, 115 B.R. at 869. 
47. [d. at 867-69. 
48. [d. at 868. 
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Furthermore, the fiduciary relationship must be independent from 
the transaction giving rise to the debt.49 Judge Derby held that the 
Maryland statute creates an express trust. 50 Nevertheless, Judge Derby 
found that the trust created by the statute would be ex maleficio and 
not a technical trust in existence.51 Therefore, according to Judge 
Derby, the trust created by the construction trust statute does not 
establish the fiduciary capacity necessary to sustain a claim of non-
dischargeability under section 523(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy CodeY 
In my previous commentary, 53 I argued that the Maryland statute 
was distinguishable from a similar Texas statute because of Mary-
land's explicit reference that a diversion of funds would constitute 
prima facie evidence of an intent to defraud. 54 As a result, I argued 
that In re Boyle,55 which construed the Texas statute and held that 
the diverter's debt would be nondischargeable, would not be persua-
sive to a court addressing dischargeability with respect to Maryland 
law. 56 In contrast to my argument that Boyle would not be persuasive, 
Judge Derby cited this Texas opinion with favor, and suggested that 
these two statutes are in fact the same with respect to dischargeability 
under section 523(a)(4) because both create fiduciary relationships ex 
maleficio. 57 
Judge Schneider of the Bankruptcy Court for the District of 
Maryland took a position similar to that taken by Judge Derby, by 
denying the use of section 9-203 of the construction trust statute to 
prove fraud in the case of In re Holmes. 58 While Judge Schneider 
agreed that the Maryland statute creates a trust ex maleficio, he 
disagreed with Judge Derby's opinion that the construction trust 
statute creates an express trust.59 In Holmes, Judge Schneider con-
cluded that the creation of an express trust depends on the intention 
of the parties; therefore, an express trust can never be created by 
statute alone.60 Judge Schneider's conclusion is consistent with the 
generally accepted theory of contracts which holds that a statute can 
49.Id. 
50. Id. at 869. Judge Schneider, in a subsequent opinion, disagreed with Judge 
Derby's assessment that the Maryland statute creates an express trust. See infra 
note 58 and accompanying text. 
51. Marino, 115 B.R. at 872. 
52. Id. 
53. See supra note 2. 
54. Albright, supra note 2, at 500. 
55. 819 F.2d 583 (5th Cir. 1987). 
56. Albright, supra note 2, at 500. 
57. In re Marino, 115 B.R. 863, 872 (Bankr. D. Md. 1990). 
58. 117 B.R. 848 (Bankr. D. Md. 1990). 
59. Id. at 852. 
60. Id. at 853. 
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never create a contract implied in law; such a statute merely creates 
quasi-contractual rights. 61 
B. Proof of Fraud 
The interpretation of the presumption contained in section 9-203 
of the construction trust statute62 became an issue in a later decision 
involving the same debtor as in the first Marino case.63 Like the 
court of appeals in Ferguson. the bankruptcy court held that the 
statutory presumption in section 9-203 of the construction trust 
statute alone was not sufficient to establish fraud under section 
523(a)(4).64 
In the second Marino case. the creditor moved for summary 
judgment on its complaint excepting to the dischargeability of the 
debt arising under section 523(a)(4).6S The creditor argued that proof 
of diversion of trust funds raises a statutory presumption of an intent 
to defraud under section 9-203 of the construction trust statute. 
thereby entitling the creditor to the grant of summary judgment.66 
Judge Derby disagreed and held that a creditor proceeding under 
section 523(a)(4) must prove "fraud in fact" and not merely "fraud 
in law. "67 Mere proof of diversion of trust funds. although consti-
tuting "fraud in law" under section 9-203 of the construction trust 
statute. does not constitute "fraud in fact. "68 To prove "fraud in 
fact:' a creditor must show that "positive. immoral acts were in 
fact conducted. "69 Accordingly. the creditor's motion for summary 
judgment was denied.70 
Based upon the second Marino case. it is clear that plaintiffs 
and creditors alike will not be able to rely on the existence of prima 
facie evidence in a case involving the construction trust statute. For 
all practical purposes. additional evidence of an intent to defraud 
must exist if a plaintiff is to prevail. or if a creditor is to succeed 
in seeking a denial of discharge in bankruptcy. 
61. See JOHN D. CALAMA1U & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, § 1-
12 (3d ed. 1987) ("A contract implied in law is not a contract at all but an 
obligation imposed by law to do justice even though it is clear that no promise 
was ever made or intended. "). 
62. Section 9-203 provides that the improper use of moneys held in trust under 
§ 9-201 shall constitute prima facie evidence of an intent to defraud. MD. CODE 
ANN., REAL PROP. § 9-203 (1988 & Supp. 1992). 
63. In re Marino, 139 B.R. 380 (Bankr. D. Md. 1992). 
64. Id. at 385. 
65. Id. at 381. 
66.Id. 
67. Id. at 383. 
68.Id. 
69.Id. 
70. Id. at 385. 
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C. Effect of State Court Judgments 
Another issue that has arisen on two occasions in Maryland's 
bankruptcy courts involves the effect of a state court judgment under 
the construction trust statute on a debtor's discharge pursuant to 
section S23(a)(4). In In re Parks,7l Judge Friend, sitting by designa-
tion, held that a state· court judgment against an individual debtor 
under the construction trust statute constituted collateral estoppel 
with regard to the creditor's complaint objecting to discharge under 
section S23(a)(4).72 In the state court proceeding, the creditor moved 
for summary judgment against the debtor; the state court entered 
summary judgment after the debtor failed to oppose the motion. 73 
Approximately one year later, the debtor filed for bankruptcy, and 
the creditor initiated an adversary proceeding to have the debt 
declared nondischargeable.74 The creditor filed a motion for summary 
judgment in the adversary proceeding, contending that the state court 
judgment collaterally estopped the debtor from raising the issue of 
the nondischargeability of the debt. 75 Judge Friend granted the cred-
itor's motion, finding that the bankruptcy court was bound by the 
state court judgment. 76 
Faced with a similar factual situation, Judge Derby distinguished 
the Parks decision. In re Piercy77 involved a creditor who had 
obtained a state court judgment against the debtor under the con-
struction trust statute. 78 Judge Derby found that the state court's 
judgment had no collateral estoppel effect because it was uncontested 
and the creditor had not moved for summary judgment.79 In granting 
the debtor's motion for summary jUdgment, Judge Derby reiterated 
that fraud under section S23(a)(4) requires "positive fraud or fraud 
in fact, involving moral turpitude or intentional wrong. "80 Accord-
ingly, a finding of fraud under section 9-203 of the construction 
trust statute was insufficient to support a finding of fraud under 
section S23(a)(4).8l 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland has recently clarified how 
the phrase "intent to defraud" should be interpreted within the 
71. 141 B.R. 92 (Bankr. D. Md. 1991). 





77. 140 B.R. 108 (Bankr. D. Md. 1992). 
78. [d. at ItO. 
79. [d. at 1l3. 
80. [d. at 114. 
81. [d. 
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meaning of the construction trust statute. While not precisely ad-
dressing the meaning of prima facie evidence of an intent to defraud, 
the court of appeals indicated how a defendant may rebut prima 
facie evidence of an intent to defraud. 
In the five years since the construction trust statute was enacted, 
the federal bankruptcy judges sitting in Maryland have circumscribed 
the use of the construction trust statute with respect to the discharge-
ability of debts. In particular, the bankruptcy judges in this district 
have not approved the use of section 9-203 of the construction trust 
statute to prove fraud under section S23(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy 
Code. 
